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Edward A. Zelinsky
1366 Ella T. Grasso Boulevard
New Haven Connecticut 06511
Phone: (203) 787-4991
E-Mail: edward.a.zelinsky@gmail.com

November 30, 2021
Office of Regulations and Interpretions
Employee Benefits Security Administration
Room N-5655
U.S. Department of Labor
200 Constitution Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20210
ATT: Prudence and Loyalty in Selecting
Plan Investments and Exercising
Shareholder Rights
RIN 1210-AC03
Sent by Express Mail and electronic submission
Dear sir/madam:
By way of identification, I am the Morris and Annie Trachman
Professor of Law at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law of
Yeshiva University.1 I teach and write in the areas of trusts,
estates, pensions, and employee benefits including the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). I hereby comment
upon the regulations proposed by the Department of Labor (DOL) on
October 14, 2021 to amend and restate 29 CFR § 2550.404a-1.2
These proposed regulations address ERISA’s fiduciary duties

1

Neither the Cardozo Law School nor Yeshiva University has
reviewed, approved or authorized this testimony or otherwise
endorses my comments. I prepared these comments for no client.
The views expressed herein are my own personal opinions. In the
interests of full disclosure, I also note that I serve as a
member of the board of directors of the Connecticut Retirement
Security Authority (CRSA). CRSA has not reviewed, approved or
authorized this testimony or otherwise endorses my comments.
2

86 Fed. Reg. 57272 (Oct. 14, 2021).
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of loyalty and prudence. Pursuant to these stringent duties,
fiduciaries must exclusively and prudently pursue pecuniary
benefits for plan participants and beneficiaries.
The proposed regulations are flawed in four respects. These
flaws weaken the duties of prudence and loyalty and thereby
jeopardize the retirement assets of America’s workers and
retirees.
First, the proposed regulations misapply the prudence
standard by embracing the “ESG” label which is too new and
unproven to be deemed prudent. Prudent investing is cautious and
conservative. ESG, as an investment category, lacks sufficient
experience to be declared prudent. ESG-investing is unproven as
the fundamental claims of ESG advocates are economically
implausible. Such advocates purport to consistently outperform
and override efficient markets. This claim is unconvincing.
Second, the “ESG” label is ambiguous and often
insubstantial. The term “ESG” is too imprecise to provide useful
regulatory guidance to ERISA fiduciaries. When the proposed
regulations attempt to provide more focused content to the ESG
concept, they demonstrate that the ESG concept often lacks any
substantial meaning.
Third, the one-sided examples of the proposed regulations
will foster misperceptions of ERISA’s fiduciary duties. The
proposed regulations will thus do what the DOL criticizes its
2020 rule for doing, i.e., promoting misperceptions of ERISA
fiduciaries’ duties. The unbalanced examples of the proposed
regulations will be read by zealous ESG advocates as supporting
an overly-expansive notion of the ESG investments ERISA
fiduciaries are permitted to make. More balanced drafting with
more even-handed examples is needed to minimize the misperception
of the proposed regulations as being more generous than they are.
Fourth, the proposed regulations improperly perpetuate and
liberalize the unpersuasive canon of “tie-breaking,” a canon
which violates ERISA’s fiduciary duty of loyalty. Under the tenet
of “tie-breaking,” “ties” among otherwise equivalent investment
choices encourage ERISA fiduciaries to pursue collateral, third
party benefits otherwise prohibited by the duty of loyalty.
However, the duty of loyalty requires exclusive consideration of
participants’ welfare – even in the face of so-called “ties.”
Under the proposed regulations, fiduciaries desiring to pursue
otherwise proscribed collateral benefits will, deliberately or
inadvertently, be encouraged to declare ties to free themselves
from the duty of loyalty and its prohibition on the pursuit of
2

third party benefits. Contrary to the teaching of the proposed
regulations, the duty of loyalty is not suspended in the presence
of “ties.”
These flaws, by attenuating the duties of prudence and
loyalty, jeopardize the retirement assets of workers and
retirees. Accordingly, the proposed regulations should be amended
to delete the imprudent, unproven and ambiguous term “ESG,” to
add more balanced examples which reduce misperceptions of ERISA’s
fiduciary duties, and to expunge altogether the concept of tiebreaking which violates the duty of loyalty by encouraging the
pursuit of collateral benefits.
Background
ERISA § 404(a)(1)3 imposes upon employee benefit plan
fiduciaries the duties of prudence and loyalty. These stringent
statutory duties derive from the common law duties4 that trustees
must act prudently and loyally to solely serve beneficiaries’
interests.5 As a loyal fiduciary, an ERISA trustee must

3

29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).

4

Tibble v. Edison International, 575 U.S. 523, 528 (2015)
(“We have often noted that an ERISA fiduciary’s duty is derived
from the common law of trusts.”) (internal quotation marks
deleted); Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension
Fund v. Central Transport, Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 570-571 (1985)
(“under ERISA...Congress invoked the common law of trusts to
define the general scope of [fiduciaries’] authority and
responsibility.”); John H. Langbein, David A. Pratt, Susan J.
Stabile and Andrew W. Stumpff, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 475476, 507-508 (6th ed. 2015); Lawrence A. Frolik and Kathryn L.
Moore, LAW OF EMPLOYEE PENSION AND WELFARE BENEFITS 308-309 (3rd ed.
2012).
5

The “principle of undivided loyalty” to the beneficiary is
“fundamental” to trust law. Restatement 3d of Trusts, § 78,
General Comment a. “Trust law frames the duty of loyalty as a
`sole’ interest rule...” Robert H. Sitkoff, Fiduciary Principles
in Trust Law, in Evan J. Criddle, Paul B. Miller, and Robert H.
Sitkoff (eds.), THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW 41 (2019). See
also Internal Revenue Code § 401(a), 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)
(qualified plan and trust are “for the exclusive benefit” of
employees and their beneficiaries); Stewart E. Sterk and Melanie
B. Leslie, ESTATES AND TRUSTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 673-674 (6th ed.
2019).
3

“discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the
interest of the participants and beneficiaries”6 “for the
exclusive purpose of...providing benefits to participants and
their beneficiaries.”7 An ERISA fiduciary must also act “with the
care, skill, prudence, and diligence...[of] a prudent man.”8 As
the Restatement of Trusts declares, the standard of prudence has
“substantive content”9 that impels “caution”10 and “conservatism”11
when fiduciaries invest.
Under the banner of “economically targeted investing” (ETI),
the DOL has encouraged the deployment of ERISA-regulated funds to
pursue alleged third party economic benefits.12 ETI is often
justified on the ground that ERISA fiduciaries confront
economically equivalent investment choices. In the face of such
“ties,” it is argued, the pursuit of third party benefits can
serve as the tie-breaking consideration.
In response, critics (myself included13) observe that a
fiduciary’s pursuit of third party benefits under the ETI banner
violates the stringent duty of loyalty. Similarly, the duty of
loyalty is violated when third party benefits are used to break

6

ERISA § 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (emphasis
added).
7

ERISA § 404(a)(1)(A)(i), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)(i)
(emphasis added).
8

ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B).

9

Restatement of Trusts (3rd) § 90, comment f.

10

Id. at § 90a and comment e.

11

Id., comment e(1).

12

Albert Feuer, Ethics, Earnings, and ERISA: EthicalFactor Investing of Savings and Retirement Benefits, NEW YORK UNIV.
REV. OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION § 6.03[4] (2020,
David Pratt, ed.); Edward A. Zelinsky, Economically Targeted
Investments: A Critical Analysis, 6 KANSAS J. OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY
39 (1997); Edward A. Zelinsky, ETI, Phone the Department of
Labor: Economically Targeted Investments, IB 94-1 and the
Reincarnation of Industrial Policy, 16 BERKELEY J. OF EMP. AND LAB.
LAW 333 (1995).
13

Id.
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“ties.” ERISA’s duty of loyalty is an exacting obligation to
exclusively pursue the retirement savings interests of plan
participants and beneficiaries. This duty commands that an ERISA
fiduciary’s “decisions must be made with an eye single to the
interests of the participants and beneficiaries”14 – to the
exclusion of other agendas, as commendable as those agendas might
otherwise be. Alleged “ties” do not permit a trustee to take into
consideration third party benefits in violation of the trustee’s
demanding duty of loyalty.
Reinforcing the message of this critique, the U.S. Supreme
Court has unanimously confirmed that ERISA requires fiduciaries
to exclusively pursue pecuniary, “financial” benefits for plan
participants and beneficiaries.15
ESG funds are today typically marketed like ETI has been
promoted, i.e., as investments which generate third party
benefits for the environment and social justice.16 Insofar as the
ESG label is used in this fashion, it is subject to the same
criticism as ETI: The duty of loyalty requires an ERISA trustee
to maximize exclusively financial benefits for ERISA participants
and beneficiaries, not to pursue another agenda as worthy as that
agenda may be.
In apparent recognition that the duty of loyalty prohibits
the pursuit of third party benefits, ESG proponents often argue
that ESG investments consistently produce higher rates of return.
The proposed regulations have obviously been influenced by this
economically implausible argument.
It is important to separate an ERISA trustee’s personal
views from her fiduciary obligations as a trustee.17 In her role

14

Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 271 (2nd Cir. 1982).

15

Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409, 420421 (2014) (emphasis omitted).
16

See, e.g., Sustainable Investing at Schroders: Beyond
Profit (“impactIQ is our set of tools that aims to measure the
impact that companies have on society and the environment. They
examine the externalities of companies...”); John Hancock
Investment Management, jhinvestments.com/esg (“Making a
difference in the world”).
17

Edward A. Zelinsky, Is Bitcoin Prudent? Is Art
Diversified? Offering Alternative Investments to 401(k)
5

as a citizen and as a private investor of her own personal funds,
an individual is free to favor any policies she wants to pursue.
But when that individual serves as an ERISA-regulated trustee,
the legal rules change because she is then investing, in Louis
Brandeis’ famous phrase, “other people’s money.”18 In these and
similar contexts, the law, including ERISA, imposes upon
fiduciaries stringent obligations of loyalty and prudence to
constrain the exercise of discretion and to focus the trustee’s
decisionmaking exclusively upon economic benefits for plan
participants and beneficiaries.
DOL characterizes the proposed regulations as a response to
the rule which the DOL itself issued in 2020. This 2020 rule, DOL
now says, “created... uncertainty”19 about the proper use by an
ERISA fiduciary of ESG considerations when making investment
decisions. The result, DOL states, is “a chilling effect” on
proper fiduciary decisionmaking,20 “putting a thumb on the scale
against the consideration of ESG factors.”21 The 2020 rule, we
are told, created misperceptions.22 Of particular concern to DOL
in this context is “climate-related financial risk.”23 The
proposed regulation, DOL tells us, “is intended to counteract
negative perception of the use of climate change and other ESG
factors in investment decisions caused by the 2020 Rules.”24
“[T]here could be instances when ESG issues present material

Participants, 54 CONN. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming), Cardozo Legal
Studies Research Paper No. 643, Available at SSRN:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3825199 at pages 8-9, 17, 52, 56, 59.
18

Louis Brandeis, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT

(1914).
19

86 Fed. Reg. 57275.

20

Id. (“the Department believes there is a reasonable basis
for these concerns.”).
21

Id.

22

Id. at 57279.

23

Id. at 57276 and id. at 57289 (“climate change as a
material risk-return factor”).
24

Id. at 57276. See Prop. Reg. § 2550.404a-1(b)(4)(i), 86
Fed. Reg. 57302 (“Climate change-related factors”).
6

business risk or opportunities.”25
ESG is Too New and Unproven to Be Deemed Prudent
As the Restatement of Trusts declares, the standard of
prudence has “substantive content”26 that impels “caution”27 and
“conservatism”28 when fiduciaries invest. Trendy is not prudent.
Tulips, the Bitcoins of the 17th century,29 were fashionable but
were never prudent. Widely-accepted investments which are today
prudent were once new, novel and thus not yet prudent. It took
time for these investments to achieve the broad acceptance which
makes them prudent today.
For example, mutual funds30 and real estate investment
trusts31 are now prudent investment categories because they have
stood the test of time. But it takes time to satisfy the test of
time. Modern portfolio theory is not so modern any more which is
why it is today prudent.32 It too has stood the test of time to
today be substantively conventional and cautious.
“[C]oncern over ESG is a relatively new phenomenon coming to
the fore during the past 10 years or so.”33 In comparison with

25

Id. at 57274.

26

Restatement of Trusts (3rd) § 90, comment f.

27

Id. at § 90(a) and comment e.

28

Id., comment e(1).

29

Shan Li, Rare Plant Market Grows In Pandemic – Greenery
attracts flippers, thieves; “it’s too crazy,” WALL ST. J. (Sept.
19, 2020) A1 (“The 1600s had the Dutch tulip market bubble.”);
Christian C. Day, Risky Business: Popular Images and Reality of
Capital Markets Handling Risk – From the Tulip Craze to the
Decade of Greed, 133 PENN. ST. L. REV. 461, 463-474 (2008).
30

Zelinsky, supra, note 17 at page 6.

31

Id. at pages 9, 32-35.

32

Langbein, et al., supra, note 4, at 554-558.

33

Bradford Cornell and Aswath Damodaran, Valuing ESG:
Doing Good or Sounding Good? (March 20, 2020) available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3557432 at 13.
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other investment vehicles which have stood the test of time, ESG
is too new and unproven to be deemed prudent as an investment
category.
ESG-investing is also unproven because the fundamental
claims of ESG advocates are economically implausible. Such
advocates purport to consistently outperform and override
efficient markets. This claim is unconvincing.
ESG proponents assert that the person making an ESG
investment is overriding the market’s allocation of resources to
pursue a greater good. This assertion is unpersuasive. When a
self-declared ESG-investor sells a stock in a competitive market,
another investor without her qualms buys it. This is simply a
game of musical chairs which, while it makes the ESG-investor
feel better, shuffles ownership without altering the marketdriven allocation of resources.34
The other major claim of ESG advocates is that ESG
investing, with its often high fees35 and active management, can
consistently outperform competitive markets. This claim too is
also economically unpersuasive. If a corporation’s superior
governance or more humane labor practices improve a corporation’s
financial prospects, the corporation’s stock price will capture
that projected income. A conventional, passive investment device,

34

Edward A. Zelinsky, The Continuing Battle Over
Economically Targeted Investments: An Analysis of DOL
Interpretative Bulletin 2015-01, 2016 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 161,
169-170, reprinted in Kathryn J. Kennedy (ed.), NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
REVIEW OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2017); Max M.
Schanzenbach and Robert H. Sitkoff, Reconciling Fiduciary Duty
and Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by
a Trustee, 72 STAN. L. REV. 381, 399 (2020).
35

Rebecca Moore, Morningstar Finds ESG Funds Are More
Expensive Than Conventional Funds (Oct. 26, 2021).
https://www.planadviser.com/morningstar-finds-esg-funds-expensive
-conventional-funds/. See also Cornell and Damodaran, supra, note
33 at 22 (“The potential to make money on ESG for consultants,
bankers and investment managers has made them cheerleaders for
the concept, with claims of the payoffs based on research that is
ambiguous and inconclusive”). The DOL repeatedly states that the
proposed regulations reflect the views of “stakeholders.” See,
e.g., 86 Fed. Reg. 57275, 57277, 57279 and 57280. It appears that
such “consultants, bankers and investment managers” were among
the stakeholders who influenced the proposed regulations.
8

such as a low fee index fund, will reflect that increased value
without invoking the ESG label and without paying fees for ESG
investing services. As Justice Breyer noted for a unanimous
court,36 “a major stock market . . . provides the best estimate
of the value of the stocks traded on it.” It is implausible that
ESG funds will consistently outperform competitive markets in
which prices efficiently reflect corporations’ projected earnings
including anticipated income stemming from so-called ESG factors.
The DOL itself acknowledges that much evidence finds “that
ESG investing has resulted in lower returns”37 while other
studies about ESG investing are “mixed or inconclusive.”38 In
this same vein, Professors Cornell and Damodaran conclude “that
the evidence that markets reward companies for being `good’ is
weak to non-existent.”39 This confirms that it is at best
premature to be incorporating the unproven ESG label into DOL’s
ERISA regulations concerning the duty of prudence.
The Ambiguity and Insubstantiality of the ESG Label
The “ESG” label is ambiguous and often insubstantial. Is ESG
investing about doing good by the world or about doing good for
the trustee’s beneficiary? When firms market their (often high
fee40) ESG products, this tension is typically ignored by
claiming to do both. As a result, the term “ESG” is often
ambiguous, a talisman with little substantive content.
Consider, for example, investments in nuclear power. Do
these qualify as ESG investments since nuclear power doesn’t send
carbon into the air? Or should an ESG investor eschew nuclear
power because of such power’s own risks? The imprecise ESG label
does not resolve this inquiry.
Some investment vehicles are, DOL states with apparent

36

Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409, 427
(2014) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
37

86 Fed. Reg. 57290.

38

Id. at 57291.

39

Cornell and Damodaran, supra, note 33 at 19.

40

Rebecca Moore, supra, note 35.
9

approbation, “ESG-themed.”41 This kind of marketing label lacks
objective content. Any fund can call itself an “ESG” investment,
particularly to justify its active management and correspondingly
high fees.
Illustrating “the inherent subjectivity of the ESG rubric,”
Professors Schanzenbach and Sitkoff pose the quandary presented
by “an environmentally sound firm” with “weak corporate
governance” or which “mistreat[s] its workforce.”42 “[I]s such a
firm a good or a bad ESG bet?” they ask.43
Legal standards often raise difficult interpretative issues.
But the failure of the ESG label to solve basic questions
indicates that, in the ERISA context at least, that label lacks
substantive content.
DOL’s attempt to provide clarifying detail reveals how often
the ESG label is insubstantial, adding nothing to the traditional
rules of prudence and loyalty. For example, implementing its
concern about climate change, the DOL tells us that an investor
should consider such possibilities as “wildfires, and
flooding.”44 This tells us nothing new. A prudent fiduciary
making a real estate investment has always been concerned with
the kind of neighborhood in which the property is located.
Labeling this conventional concern as “ESG” may be trendy, but it
illuminates nothing new.
Consider, as well, the DOL’s argument that a prudent ESG
investor favors “a shift from carbon-intensive investments.”45 In
my capacity as a citizen, I strongly favor a stiff carbon tax and
have driven a hybrid car for the last 16 years. But an ERISAfiduciary who acted on DOL’s ESG-based investment advice this

41

86 Fed. Reg. 57294; id. at 57297.

42

Schanzenbach and Sitkoff, supra, note 34 at 430.

43

Id. See also Cornell and Damodaran, supra, note 33 at 2
(“a ranking of companies from good to bad by Greenpeace bears
little resemblance to a listing of good and bad companies by a
group focused on labor rights.”); Allysia Finley, How Did
Activision Pass the ESG Test? THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Nov. 26,
2021) page A15.
44

86 Fed. Reg. 57276.

45

Id. at 57277.
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last year disserved her beneficiaries as fossil fuel stocks have
outperformed other stocks.46
In short, the DOL was right to delete the term “ESG” when it
finalized the 2020 rule. That term is ambiguous47 and often lacks
any substantial meaning. Incorporating that imprecise and
insubstantial term into the DOL regulations weakens the
protection of the retirement assets of workers and retirees.
The One-Sided Examples of the Proposed Regulations Will Encourage
Misperceptions
The DOL now criticizes its 2020 rule for encouraging
misperceptions of ERISA’s fiduciary duties. Its 2020 rule, the
DOL tells us, has “been interpreted as putting a thumb on the
scale against” the consideration of ESG factors.48 As a result,
“many stakeholders misperceive” their legal authority and
responsibilities.49 DOL characterizes its proposed regulations as
clarifying the rule which the DOL itself issued in 2020, a rule
which “may have led to a misunderstanding among some...”50
This same criticism of creating misperceptions applies to
the proposed 2021 regulations. As drafted, these proposed

46

Jeff Sommer, The Planet Is Warming, but Coal Is on Fire,
THE NEW YORK TIMES (Oct. 24, 2021) § BU, page 4; Amrith Ramkumar,
Climate-Focused Investors Miss Oil-and-Gas Rally, THE WALL STREET
JOURNAL (Oct. 25, 2021) page A1.
47

Schanzenbach and Sitkoff, supra, note 34 at 388 (“ESG
investing resists precise definition”) and at 397 (“inherently
ambiguous”).
48

86 Fed. Reg. 57294.

49

Id. at 57279. See also id. (“created a blanket
perception”), id. at 57275 (“created a perception”), id. at 57288
(“had a chilling effect”), id. (“the negative perception”), id.
(“doubt caused by the current regulation”) id. (“unwarranted
concerns”), id. (“ambiguity or uncertainty, resulting from the
Department’s prior guidance.”), id. (“uncertainty”), id. at 57289
(“many stakeholders continue to have confusion or doubt on the
matter”) and id. (“lingering uncertainty”).
50

86 Fed. Reg. 57292. See also id. at 57285 (“Responses to
the 2020 rules, however, suggest that the new rules may have
inadvertently caused more confusion than clarity.”).
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regulations, with their one-sided examples, will be read by
zealous ESG advocates as supporting an overly-expansive approach
to ESG investing. The proposed regulations do what the DOL
criticizes the 2020 rule for doing, i.e., encouraging
misperceptions of ERISA’s fiduciary duties. More balanced
drafting including more even-handed examples is needed to
minimize the misinterpretation of the proposed regulations as
being more generous than they are.
In the proposed regulations, every example of a factor
“material to the risk-return analysis” involves a so-called “ESG”
consideration.51 While the DOL admits that “ESG factors are [not]
material in every instance,”52 the proposed regulations contain
no example when this is so. The unbalanced nature of these
examples creates the same possibility for which the DOL now
criticizes its 2020 regulations, i.e., creating misperceptions.
The unbalanced examples of the proposed regulations will foster
an overly-expansive notion of the prevalence of ESG factors.
The one-sided examples of the proposed regulations cite not
a single instance of a nonESG factor which makes an investment
prudent, e.g., that a company makes good products or has a
compelling strategy for the future or has excellent cost
controls. Examples along these lines are needed for balance.
A careful reading of the proposed regulations leads to a
more nuanced understanding. But that was also true of the 2020
rule. A subtext of DOL’s criticism of the 2020 rule is implicit
concern for how casual or skittish readers may perceive the
import of administrative pronouncements. Under that standard, the
proposed regulations suffer from the same malady do as the 2020
rule: Many casual and risk-averse readers of the proposed
regulations and their one-sided examples will infer from that
one-sidedness that all ESG factors are relevant to prudent
investment decisions, that only ESG factors are relevant to
prudent investment decisions, and that ESG investing is mandatory
for ERISA fiduciaries.
Such misperception can best be eliminated by deleting from
the proposed regulation the ambiguous, unproven and imprudent ESG
moniker. If DOL will not go this far, misperception can be
minimized by pruning the examples of the proposed regulations and

51

See proposed regulation § 2550.404a-1(b)(4) at 86 Fed.
Reg. 57302-57303.
52

86 Fed. Reg. 57290.
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by adding counterbalancing examples. These additional examples
should illustrate when it is not prudent to consider so-called
ESG factors as well as add illustrations of economically material
nonESG investment factors, e.g., good products, compelling
corporate strategy, tight cost controls. In the absence of these
kinds of illustrations, the one-sided examples of the proposed
regulations may cause a casual or risk-averse reader to
misperceive that ESG factors are always relevant, that nonESG
factors are of minimal import, and that ESG investing is
mandatory.
Tie-Breaking Violates the Duty of Loyalty
The proposed regulations improperly liberalize the rule of
tie-breaking.53 DOL should instead abolish the notion of tiebreaking altogether.54 The rule of tie-breaking violates the
rigorous duty of loyalty and thereby weakens protections for
workers and retirees. The duty of loyalty requires exclusive55
concentration on participants’ welfare – even in the face of socalled “ties.”
Tie-breaking introduces into the fiduciary decisionmaking
process a consideration – the pursuit of third party benefits -which does not belong in that process. Fiduciaries desiring to
seek third party benefits will, deliberately or inadvertently, be
encouraged to declare ties to free themselves from the duty of
loyalty.
The rule of tie-breaking invites a fiduciary who wants to
pursue collateral benefits to declare a tie to relieve himself of
his obligation of loyalty to the plan’s participants and
beneficiaries. Even if a fiduciary is not consciously aware of
this proclivity, the lessons of behavioral economics56 suggest

53

Id. at 57279 (“proposed broadening” of the tie-breaking
rule) and id. at 57289 (“a formulation that is intended to be
broader”). See proposed regulation § 2550.404a-1(c)(3) at 86 Fed.
Reg. 57303.
54

Zelinsky, supra, note 34 at 165-169; Schanzenbach and
Sitkoff, supra, note 34 at 408-411.
55

ERISA § 404(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (emphasis

added).
56

In vocabulary which has become widely accepted,
decisionmakers are perceived to be affected by the way possible
13

that fiduciaries may be “nudged” to find ties among investment
alternatives so that they can pursue third party benefits as the
tie-breaking consideration.
The stringent duty of loyalty precludes the deliberate or
inadvertent pursuit of third party benefits. The exacting terms
used to describe that duty – “exclusive,”57 “solely,”58 “undivided
loyalty”59 – forbid consideration of third party benefits, even
in the face of so-called ties.
If two investment alternatives are equally good choices,
ERISA’s command to prudently diversify60 indicates that the plan
trustee should buy some of each equally good alternative. If 100
common shares of Corporation A are exactly equivalent to 100
common shares of Corporation B, the trustee should buy 50 shares
of each. In the rare case where the trustee cannot diversify in
this fashion among equivalent choices, it is better for the
fiduciary to flip a coin rather than introduce into the fiduciary
decisionmaking process consideration of collateral benefits.
The DOL tells us that the proposed regulations embody “a
more flexible version of the tie-breaker concept.”61 This
suggested liberalization of the tie-breaking rule moves the
regulations in the wrong direction by attenuating the protection
of retirement assets. ERISA fiduciary “decisions must be made
with an eye single to the interests of the participants and

decisions are “framed.” Framing “nudges” decisionmakers to
particular outcomes. Permitting consideration of third party
benefits in the case of “ties” frames the investment decision in
a way which nudges the fiduciary to find “ties” so she can
consider third party benefits. See Cass R. Sunstein, THE ETHICS OF
INFLUENCE: GOVERNMENT IN THE AGE OF BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE 5-6 (on nudging)
and 116-117 (on framing) (2016); Margot E. Kaminski and Guy A.
Rub, Copyright’s Framing Problem, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1102 (2017);
Jessica L. Roberts, Nudge-Proof: Distributive Justice and the
Ethics of Nudging, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1045 (2018).
57

ERISA § 404(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A).

58

ERISA § 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).

59

Restatement 3d of Trusts, § 78, General Comment a.

60

ERISA § 404(a)(1)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C).

61

86 Fed. Reg. 57294; id. at 57300.
14

beneficiaries.”62 The rule of tie-breaking flunks this demanding
test of loyalty by encouraging ERISA fiduciaries to pursue third
party benefits in the face of such ties.63 Contrary to the
teaching of the proposed regulations, the duty of loyalty is not
suspended in the presence of “ties.”
Conclusion
The flaws of the proposed regulations weaken the duties of
prudence and loyalty and thereby jeopardize the retirement assets
of America’s workers and retirees. Accordingly, the proposed
regulations should be amended to delete the imprudent, unproven
and ambiguous term “ESG,” to add more balanced examples to reduce
misperceptions of ERISA’s fiduciary duties, and to expunge
altogether the concept of tie-breaking which violates the duty of
loyalty by encouraging the pursuit of collateral benefits.
Sincerely,
Edward A. Zelinsky
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